وزيرنا الحالي المكلف بافريقيا وباوروبا و سفير سابق للدولة الصحراوية في الجزائر، محمد يسلم بيسط، يبدو انه في أسوأ لحظاته.
تدمير الثقة امر لا يغفر في مدونات قواعد السلوك التي تحكم تقاليدن قيادتنا الوطنية،و يبدو ان الوزير تكلم اكثر من اللازم.
الدبلوماسي الشاب تحدث للامريكان عارضا جهله التام. إن عدم معرفته للسياسة و القانون جعله يتحدث عن التشاورالشعبي عوضا عن الإستفتاء. وكما يبدو ان استعماله لهذه المصطلحات اثار انتباه المتحدثين معه. حين سُئِل ما الفرق بينهما، الشاب الدبلوماسي ظهر اكثرجهلا لما أجاب بتساوي المصطلحين.
وكانت اشد لحظات ضعف اليبلوماسي الصحراوي حسب ماهو وارد في وثيقة ويكيليكس كانت عند ما صرح للامريكيين ببعض خبايا البيت الداخلي الصحراوي ، و من داخل مؤسسة سيادية كمقر رئاسة الجمهورية. وفي حديث مع الامريكيين اباح لهم بان مولود سعيد (ممثل البوليساريو بواشنطن) لن يبقىى طويلا في منصبه، نظرا للغضب الهائل الذى انتاب محمد عبد العزيز حين لم تؤيدالولايات المتحدة حق الشعب الصحراوي في تقرير المصير كما كان يؤكد له مولود سعيد.
وللاشارة ان بيسط كانت له الكلمة الفصل في التعيينات الاخيرة بالسلك الديبلوماسي الصحراوي . والتي كانت كارئية على القضية الصحراوية .
السيد بيسط وبالرجوع الى وثيقة ويكيليكس يفتخر امام الامريكيين بان جميع المواضيع الحساسة توجدعلى تحت رقابته، نظرا لصفته سفير صحراوي لدى الدولة الجزائرية و لأهمية العلاقة بين البلدين. و كأنه يقول : ’’ اعرف الكثير، لديكم ماتقدموا؟’’.
لتوفير مثال من المواضيع المتعددة التي تخص سفارته، بيسط، تطرق، امام الامريكيين، الى التدريبات التي توفرها الجزائر للبوليساريو.، و هو مايعني ان بعض رجال الديبلوماسية الصحراوية بحاجة الى فترة تربصية في مجال كتمان السر .
في انتظار الحصول على ترجمة موثوقة لكابلات ويكيليكس، نترككم مع النسخة الاصلية باللغة الانكليزية
C O N F I D E N T I A LALGIERS 000637 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017 TAGS: PREL [ExternalPolitical Relations], PBTS [National Boundaries, Territories, and Sovereignty],PHUM [Human Rights], AG [Algeria], MO [Morocco], WI [Western Sahara] SUBJECT:POLISARIO AMBASSADOR ON TALKS WITH MOROCCO Classified By: DCM Thomas F.Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) The Polisario wasgenerally satisfied with UNSCR 1754, Polisario Ambassador to Algeria MohamedBeissat told DCM May 7, but took issue with the resolution's praise for Morocco's "serious and credible" autonomy proposal. Such language wouldembolden Morocco , Beissat said, to approach the negotiations from a positionof confidence that it had U.S. backing, and was also inconsistent with thesearch for the solution providing for Sahrawi self-determination described inthe resolution. Beissat was also disappointed that the resolution referred to"the parties" and not to Morocco and the Polisario specifically. Hepreferred the wording about the parties in the UNSYG's report to the Council.Beissat said ultimately only the Polisario and Morocco were parties to thedispute, even though he took the DCM's point that one aim of the resolution wasto involve neighboring countries in efforts to find a lasting solution.
2. ¶2. (C) Turning to theprocess by which UNSCR 1754 was adopted, Beissat suggested that the Friendsplayed too great a role in determining the language of the resolution. DCMnoted in response that the approach was not an unusual one and served toexpedite reaching a final draft, but Beissat grumbled that it was"undemocratic." Beissat further expressed the Polisario'sdisappointment that the United States did not support efforts to make the Sahrawipeople's right to self-determination a primary aim of the resolution.Fortunately, he said, the final resolution included the principle. He addedthat the Polisario also felt betrayed by Spain , whose actions with respect tothe resolution did not reflect the positions that Spanish officials hadoutlined to the Polisario in the lead-up to it. Nonetheless, Beissat madeclear, the Polisario was generally satisfied by the resolution and wouldapproach dialogue with the Moroccans in good faith. He opined, however, thatthe Moroccans were unlikely to take the discussions seriously, having alreadybeen "armored" by strong U.S. support. SPECULATION ABOUT THE MEDIATOR------------------------------
3. ¶3. (C) Beissat said it was"well known" that the Polisario did not think highly of UN SecretaryGeneral's personal envoy on the Western Sahara , Peter Van Walsum. PolisarioSecretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz had communicated that view, he said, to Banki-Moon. Beissat said the Polisario would attend the talks with the Moroccansregardless of the mediator the UNSYG selected, but he implied that theirpreference would be for a Scandinavian. While the Polisario had historicallybeen most comfortable with an American mediator like James Baker, Beissat said,this was now out of the question given the U.S. alignment with Moroccan views.Likewise, the Polisario no longer desired to hold the talks in the U.S. He saidthe Polisario would not object to a non-European mediator, but stressed thatthe mediator needed to be of sufficient international stature and immune tocorruption by Morocco . Beissat explained that having a mediator of stature wasimportant so that neither party could walk away from the talks withoutconsequences on the international stage. CHOOSING SIDES --------------
4. ¶4. (C) Beissat said thePolisario leadership would select its delegation to the talks afterconsultations in May with UN officials. That said, he believed that MohamedKhaddad and Ahmed Boukhari (Polisario representatives to MINURSO and to the UNin New York respectively) would "definitely" be part of thedelegation. He observed that Mohamed Abdelaziz had special confidence inKhaddad in these matters. Beissat was unsure if the three other Polisariodelegates to the Baker Plan talks -- Brahim Ghali, Rhadi Sgheir Bachir andBrahim Mokhtar -- would participate, but appeared to think it likely. As forthe Moroccan side, Beissat stated a clear Polisario preference for a seniorMoroccan delegation including individuals close to King Mohammed VI. He alsoasserted strongly that the Polisario did not want to see on the Moroccandelegation any "converts" -- former Polisario members who had goneover to the Moroccan side -- or members of CORCAS. The personal dynamics of thediscussions would be far better, he said, if no Moroccans with direct ties tothe Sahrawis or Western Sahara participated. COMMENT -------
5. ¶5. (C) Beissat invited us tomeet with him and was clearly probing for information on two specific issues:whether the U.S. has a particular agenda it plans to pursue with respect to thePolisario-Morocco negotiations (especially as regards backing the Moroccanautonomy plan); and whether we have a specific mediator/facilitator in mind. Wetold him we had no reason to believe that Washington had made any decisions ineither respect. Overall, he was noticeably less belligerent than during ourlast meeting before the vote on UNSCR 1754, and confined his warnings toremarks about the need for the U.S. not to back the autonomy plan openly. Itmay be noteworthy that Beissat in this discussion referred repeatedly to a"popular consultation" as the outcome the Polisario desired for theSahrawis, rather than specifically a "referendum." When we questionedhim about that, he seemed to equate the two, but it was a departure from hisusual rhetoric.
6. ¶6. (C) Although Beissatcaveated his views as those of a "junior diplomat," he noted thatmost every matter of significance to the Polisario leadership was on his radarscreen given the importance of the Polisario's relationship with Algeria .Listing the activities his embassy was required to support, Beissat evenmentioned military training provided by the Algerians to the Polisario. Atanother loose moment, Beissat mentioned that Mouloud Said, the Polisariorepresentative in Washington , had been assuring the Polisario leadership untillate in the process that the U.S. would maintain its express support forself-determination. When the U.S. draft resolution omitted mention ofself-determination, Abdelaziz had been unpleasantly surprised. Beissat noted,perhaps jokingly, that Mouloud Said might not be in Washington much longer. FORD
